to the restriction that their members have a real choice of whether to continue their affiliation." 1 This may seem obvious. If associations are indeed organized "as their members wish" then how can there be any further question about the proper scope of their authority over those members? Indeed, why even require that the members have a "real choice" about whether to remain in the group? Chandran Kukathas suggests that "Cultural communities should . . . be looked on this way: as associations of individuals whose freedom to live according to communal practices each finds acceptable is of fundamental importance."
2 However, the test of acceptability to each is extraordinarily exigent. Most cultural communities seek to impose an internal discipline on their members without regard to whether it is approved by each and every one.
The right of exit would be otiose if each member enjoyed a veto against the group. But that strikes squarely at the source of the problem. Few if any of the familiar social groups give individual members a veto over their ways-perhaps no group of any scope or significance could even survive on those terms. No doubt this is why Kukathas is tempted to relax the test and require only acceptability to a majority of the group. "The practices of communities of individuals, the majority of whom accept the legitimacy of the association, must... be accepted, the views of dissidents notwithstanding." 3 This suggests something rather different: a two-stage process according to which the rights of individuals within the group are determined by communal practice while the legitimacy of communal practice is determined by majority rule. This is a pleasantly democratic view of things. Few social groups or cultural communities operate according to majority rule. Universities, churches, professional associations all typically claim legitimacy on other grounds.
So the problem is this: What we call "the wishes of the members" may at best amount to no more than the wishes of a majority of members, or, more typically, even just the wishes of the most powerful members, or the oldest members, that is to say, the wishes of a subgroup sanctioned by some familiar basis of social authority as having the right to speak for the whole. That reality helps explain why there must be what Rawls calls a real choice of whether to continue affiliation. In that context, the right of exit is a promise to internal dissidents that even if the majority, the priests, or the elders can dictate the terms, they cannot compel membership.
That much is not terribly controversial, at least in broad outline. The hard question is whether such a right of exit is enough to protect internal dissidents. For it is also part of the common view that, subject to respecting a right of exit, the groups are entitled to sovereignty over their members. Those who don't like it are free to leave, much in the way a consumer can 1. John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 212 (1971) leave the market for a product that he or she finds too high in price or too low in quality. Thus, within voluntary social groups, rights of exit are held to be an adequate substitute for the basic liberties.
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In this article I test and reject that idea. I argue that insofar as individual autonomy is the value that grounds rights of exit, this very same consideration also grounds a family of related rights, and thus social groups do not in justice enjoy unlimited sovereignty over their members, not even when the members are perfectly free to leave. Hence, the familiar contrast between the liberties appropriate under a democratic government and those appropriate in special social groups is exaggerated. This has, as we shall see, some important implications for the possibility and value of some forms of communitarian and identity politics.
II. FREE AND PURPOSIVE ASSOCIATIONS
The familiar view just sketched depends on a dual contrast between social groups and the state. Social groups are said to be both free and purposive institutions, whereas the state is neither. The state is a realm of compulsion, not freedom, and there are no overarching purposes that its subjects can be assumed to have in common. This twofold difference gives political organizations wider duties than particular social groups. Because exit from the state is not realistically possible, and because the state may not assume a unity of moral purpose, it must respect the basic liberties of freedom of association, participation, conscience, nondiscrimination, and so on. The absence of those background conditions gives social groups freer reign over their own members.
One influential statement of this idea appears in Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration. His argument about the proper relations between states and churches turns on what he takes to be the essential nature and functions of each. Locke defines a church as "a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord, in order to the publick worshipping of God, in such a manner as theyjudge acceptable to him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls." 4 The fact that it is a voluntary society means both that "No body is born a member of any Church" and that it should remain "as free for him to go out as it were to enter." 5 Locke held that no one is born subject to a government, and that legitimate political power depends on consent and on the government respecting the terms for which political power has been entrusted to it. However, even if this is the ultimate foundation of political legitimacy, government retains the power of ultimate coercive force-and that force is, Locke thinks, inappropriate and even irrational in matters of doctrine. Sincere belief cannot be compelled, so the 4. John Locke, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 28 (J.H. Tully ed., 1983). 5. Id.
internal ways of churches must be tolerated, provided they do not trespass on the proper realm of governments.
Thus, social groups are voluntary associations in a way that the state is not; it exercises compulsory jurisdiction over everyone within its territory, whether they are citizens, resident aliens, refugees, or tourists. When t h e r e are open borders and a right of emigration people may leave, but t h i s choice is itself regulated by the state and, typically, subject to many c o n d itions, some of them restrictive. Moreover, apart from these legalities, it is i n social and economic terms enormously difficult for most people to u p r o o t and emigrate, and they do so only to enter the jurisdiction of another state. And, above all, the authority of the state claims to be both comprehensive and supreme: It claims power to regulate a wide range of human behavior, and to decide whether any other social authorities are to be tolerated. Rawls concludes from this that fundamental differences exist between states a n d subordinate social groups:
In a democratic society nonpublic power, as seen, for example, in the authority of churches over their members, is freely accepted. In the case of ecclesiastical power, since apostasy and heresy are not legal offenses, those who are no longer able to recognize a church's authority may cease being members without running afoul of state power. . . . By contrast, the government's authority cannot be evaded except by leaving the territory over which it governs, and not always then.... The government's authority cannot, then, be freely accepted in the sense that the bonds of society and culture, of history and social place of origin, begin so early to shape our life and are normally so strong that the right of emigration (suitably qualified) does not suffice to make accepting its authority free, politically speaking, in the way that liberty of conscience suffices to make accepting ecclesiastical authority free, politically speaking.
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Social groups are thus free associations from the political point of view. No one is legally or politically compelled to be a member of any of them. If membership brings limitations on belief and behavior, if it subjects adherents to practices that would otherwise be discriminatory, unjust, or foolish, then these disadvantages nonetheless flow from a free decision to belong, and any of them can be evaded by leaving the group.
Let us turn now to the second contrast. Social groups form the middlerange of political life within which people pursue common goals; these are purposive associations. Culture, nation, religion, family, profession, avocation-these are the things that make most people's lives valuable. To a greater or lesser degree, these associations embody the shared values and commitments of their members. Though free, social groups are not anarchic. As Locke observed, "Forasmuch as no Society, how free soever, or upon whatsoever slight occasion instituted . . . but will presently dissolve 6. John Rawls, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 221-22 (1993) . and break to pieces, unless it be regulated by some Laws, and the Members all consent to observe some Order, Place, and time must be agreed on; rules for admitting and excluding Members must be establisht... ."
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The precise content of these laws will depend on the degree and nature of consensus within the group. Because experiments in living are normally joint ventures, human freedom requires the power to associate with the like-minded. This is quite different from the normal situation in the modern state. It is not that the state has no point, just that its point cannot be characterized by a shared purpose in life, except at a level so abstract and general that it could resolve no disagreement about what is to be done. On the contrary, it is assumed that the liberal state will need to be able to rule citizens whose views about the fundamental purposes of life diverge: They may serve God or Mammon; they may make submarines or sonnets. Particular social groups can take for granted a certain amount of common ground, and on that agreed basis impose restrictions of their members. The state cannot, or at any rate should not.
Hence, social groups may enjoy substantial degree of autonomy in their internal constitutions in order to channel the energies of their members toward these shared ends. As Rawls notes, Tor churches and universities different principles are plainly more suitable. Their members usually affirm certain shared purposes as essential guidelines to the most appropriate form of organization." 8 A university, for instance, need not aim to satisfy principles of distributive justice-we need not teach so as to give the greatest benefit to the worst-off students. A religion may reject freedom of conscience, or equality of the sexes. A minority linguistic group may suppress competitor languages. The uniformity of purpose and direction makes these practices not only predictable, but morally acceptable. The kind of pluralism that is thought to warrant toleration and restraint in the context of a whole political society is attenuated in smaller social groups. A whole society contains different religions that must somehow find a way to coexist; that is the social background to freedom of conscience. These differences are effaced in a single church. Thus, while fundamental principles of justice will structure the environment in which a church exists-it may not count on laws against apostasy to secure its membership, it may not be supported by the public purse, and so on-those principles will not directly regulate its internal constitution. The more agreement in the basic framework of values, the less needed are the restraints of tolerance and the framework of the basic liberties. Bear in mind that the conclusion is that they are less needed and not that they are unneeded. Rawls says that "different principles" of social organization are more suitable to particular groups, not that there are no relevant principles of internal justice. Nonetheless, the general idea is that social groups should have in these respects much more latitude than the state.
This conclusion is congenial to one popular view about the conditions for social and cultural diversity. If we are to celebrate and sustain difference, if we value multiculturalism in a cosmopolitan world, then we will need to have the political space where such difference can prosper. A cosmopolitan world may, at the century's end, be our historical fate; but if real diversity is to flourish, we need a social union of social unions that are not themselves cosmopolitan, that embody and defend their distinctive ideals and purposes, even when that requires restrictions on the rights of their members. We need mosaics, not melting pots.
III. ENTRY AND EXIT
The view just described holds that, as free and purposive associations, particular social groups are entided to wider control over their members provided always that they respect their rights of exit. Clearly, if people were compelled to belong to a group, then we would be less likely to exempt it from the obligation to respect the ordinary principles of political morality. The right to exit is obviously playing a critical role in this reasoning; we need to explore it in more detail.
It is often supposed, especially by those who have in mind the model of a perfecdy competitive market, that exit is an unproblematic concept. Albert Hirschman, for example, believes that what he calls "voice"-remaining within a group and striving for change-is a more difficult concept, because trying to change a state of affairs is more complex and difficult than merely leaving it. 9 Voice is a matter of strategy and gradation; exit is a one-off, either-or decision. In fact, however, things are not this simple. The spatial metaphor of an exit has clearest application to territorially bounded groups. To exit the state is to leave its territory and (excepting cases of extraterritorial jurisdiction) when one permanently crosses the border, that is it. But what does it mean to leave a religion or a nation-to say nothing of an ethnic group or a sexual orientation? In these cases, too, we find kinds, or at least degrees, of belonging and alienation.
Many ways in which one can cease to be a member of a social group do not involve freely leaving. For example, a group may dissolve or disband, thus one will cease to owe it any obligations, and one's moral position will presumably revert to the status quo ante. (This was an important part of Locke's doctrine of revolution: In some circumstances political society may dissolve, freeing people from their obligations of obedience.) Alternatively, members may be ostracized or expelled for refusing to comply with a group s norms. Neither of these are what the above account has in mind by the notion of exit. The fact that a group is liable to dissolve does nothing to lessen the burden of internal restrictions while it still exists, and the scope of a group's authority to expel members is itself one of the internal restrictions whose status we need to justify.
The relevant sense of exit is that of voluntarily leaving the effective jurisdiction of the group. In the case of groups with a territorial jurisdiction, that means leaving the territory. A group's jurisdiction is given by the scope of the norms that regulate the belief or behavior of its members. What it purports to regulate, and what it in fact does regulate, may, of course, vary, as may the effectiveness of its norms. The Roman Catholic Church, for example, purports to prohibit sex outside marriage and birth control within it; but it notoriously fails in this, for adherents widely ignore the prescribed sexual morality. On the other hand, in Italy, Spain, and Quebec the Church used to direct the political loyalties of its members although it did not officially purport to do so. It seems reasonable to suppose, then, that people must be free to leave not only the dejure but also the de facto jurisdiction of a group.
What is the point of exit? First and most obviously, it has a protective function. If the group harms the interests of the member as the member sees them, then leaving is a form of self-defense. Of course, it would be wrong to suppose that the protective function is effective only when exit is actually exercised. The possibility of exit may itself make the group responsive to the interests of its members. Second, exit may also have an expressive function, for it is commonly held that leaving is in a way to criticize the group, while remaining is to support it. This point is often exaggerated and misunderstood. Beginning with Plato, many have taken the refusal to leave as an expression of an agreement to obey. In the Crito, Plato has the Laws say to Socrates:
[W]e . . . declare, by the fact of granting the privilege to any Athenian who wishes it, when he comes of age and sees how things are in the city, and sees us the laws, that anybody who is not satisfied with us is permitted to take what belongs to him and to emigrate to wherever he pleases. And not one of us laws stands in the way or forbids it... .
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The Laws claim that not only did Socrates not emigrate, but that he rarely traveled abroad, willingly raised his children there, and even preferred death to exile. On this basis, they conclude that Socrates has "given this agreement to them more emphatically than almost any other Athenian." Woozley trans., Duckworth 1979).
11. 7<f. 52a at 153.
effect. However, it is unlikely that refusal to leave can normally be taken as any kind of agreement to obey. Voluntary obligations are belief-dependent: • No one agrees unless he believes that he does. But most people do n o t ' believe that failure to exit means that they have agreed to obey. Moreover, the option of remaining must be a reasonable one, and as Hume noted, the vast majority of people simply have no choice but to stay out: The costs of uprooting are usually insurmountable and, often enough, no other state will take them in. Is the idea of grounding the authority of groups in tacit consent any more plausible here than it is in the case of political obligation? It is as difficult to leave many social groups as it is to leave the state, and in some cases it is even impossible. Consider, to begin, that exit from many groups involves taking along a lot of baggage. There are, in the first place, the ordinary consequences of socialization. Those groups that are most important in human life are precisely those in which the mechanical notions of "entry" and "exit" seem less helpful in understanding how people come to be members than do the organic notions of growth and development. For example, save for adult converts, most religious people inherit their faith. Now, Locke insists that "No body is born a member of any Church," 12 but in one straightforward sense, that is precisely what they are. They grow up in a family or school with religious outlooks and values that they internalize and adapt. This produces a whole set of profound effects, including-sometimes-the feeling that one is so intimately bound up with the fate of one's religion that it is almost a part of one's personal identity. Abandoning this is so unlike the process of entering or leaving the market for a car or a health club that any similarities seem overwhelmed by the differences.
Locke held that only mature individual reflection and acceptance could bring a person within the authority of a church. Nevertheless, the circumstances of birth, family, and community may make for more or less propitious circumstances for that reflection. Locke's highly individualistic, Protestant view about the free acceptance of faith needs to be set against the trite but important fact that the vast majority of religious people end up accepting what they were raised to believe. Surely this convergence of judgment is better explained by the constitutive power of early socialization than it is by the coincidence of people having reasoned their way to identical conclusions. Indeed, such are the normal processes of training that it may even be difficult for members to get an adequate perspective on the groups that contributed to their formation. Even to contemplate leaving requires enough cognitive and emotional distance to understand and envision a new future. Achieving that is a great challenge and it explains why rejecting one's family of origin, abandoning one's religion, or coming out of the closet are typically wrenching and life-transforming experiences.
It is interesting that this truth is rarely disputed when it comes to the question of political membership. As Rawls says in the passage quoted 12. Locke, supra note 4, at 28. above 13 the bonds of society, culture, history, and place of origin are so firm that enjoying a right to emigrate still does not make accepting the authority of the state a free act. Why then is the bare existence of legal freedom of conscience sufficient to make accepting ecclesiastical authority free? It is true that Rawls claims only that it is free "from the political point of view," meaning that we have no civic obligation to a particular faith. But does that suffice to make the acceptance of ecclesiastical authority sufficiently free to require no limits beyond the right to exit in the way that Kukathas, for example, suggests? We need not adopt the unacceptable thesis that socialization turns people into zombies, unable to assess their options and thus unfree. It is a major (if still unfulfilled) task of social theory to explain the circumstances in which socialization does render people unfree, and those in which it does not. Fortunately, that is not the question we face here.
14 We are not asking the absolute question, "Are these people unfree?" but only the comparative question, "Are they routinely more free than they are in the state?" On the relevant point of comparison, we must conclude that the two cases are more similar than first appears, for the bonds that Rawls refers to are no less tight in the case of particular social groups, and often more so. It is not uncommon for people to feel a closer bond to their churches, families, and ethnic groups than they do to the larger and more anonymous political union in which they find themselves.
In some cases, the lack of freedom is practically identical, and here I come to the second point. The incidents of group membership are sometimes ascriptive. In these respects, to be a member is simply to be taken for a member. This is not, or not entirely, a function of one's own will. This is of particular significance in the case of groups that are stigmatized or oppressed. Jean-Paul Sartre famously argued that Jewishness is not a function of shared religion, history, ethnicity, or values, but simply shared oppression: "The Jew is one whom other men consider a Jew . . . it is the anti-semite that makes the Jew," 15 he wrote. This may be exaggeration, but it is true that secular Jews in Europe routinely found that their attempts to exit their religion were regarded as irrelevant by Nazis and their collaborators. And in many countries race is ascribed to people in ways that may be largely independent of their ancestry. In the United States, for instance, blacks are all those who are so regarded by whites: Thus the notorious "one drop rule" according to which any degree of African ancestry makes one black. This is not to deny that ascriptive identities often come to have a life of their own and that people may, for a variety of reasons, willingly embrace and elaborate the identities with which others 13. Rawls, supra note 6. 14. Kukathas misunderstands this point Of course it is true that one may freely assume substantial risks. But the relevant question is whether the risks of exiting social groups are so much less than the risk of leaving one's state as to obviate the need for rights apart from exit. have saddled them. However, it does show the limits of individual will in attempting to leave such groups. Now, the fact that one cannot shed an ascriptive identity does not by itself, establish that one cannot escape the jurisdiction of a group whose identity it is. That depends on who is doing the ascribing. A Jew can leave t h e congregation even if he cannot shed his identity as a Jew. On the other hand, there are situations in which the group itself does the ascribing a n d makes that the condition of membership. Consider, for example, the Canadian case of Thomas v. Norris.
l& Thomas was an Indian who had lived off the reserve most of his life, was not raised in the traditional culture or religion of the band, knew little of it, and explicitly rejected what he knew. Nonetheless, he was subjected to certain rituals in the course of which he was ; assaulted, battered, and forcibly confined. His Indian captors did not accept that he had validly exercised any powers of exit, and claimed him as one of their own and subject to their collective aboriginal right to maintain their ways. (The court did not agree, and Thomas's tort action was successful.) In such cases, it is not clear how the right to exit might even be exercised.
Let us take stock. First, exit is itself a complex notion. Second, the sort of considerations that show that accepting political authority may be unfree notwithstanding a right to emigrate also establish that accepting membership in social groups may also be unfree, notwithstanding the existence of a right of exit. That the acceptance of ecclesiastical authority is free from the political point of view may therefore be of no more significance than the fact that the acceptance of political authority is free from, say, the Taoist point of view. The individual's actual capacity to escape either may be limited by the same sort of personal and economic considerations, and, in cases of ascriptive membership, it may simply be impossible. All of this strongly suggests that the sharp distinction that is commonly drawn between the state and smaller social groups cannot be sustained.
IV. AUTONOMY AND EXIT
What then is the relationship between the right of exit and the internal constitution of groups? According to Kukathas, the only fundamental right is that of freedom of association: Provided exit is guaranteed, cultural communities should be free to do with their members as they wish. Our respect for their policies is owed not, as some of their defenders suppose, to minority cultures in their own right nor even as a collective good for their members, but only to the associative (and dissociative) choices of individuals:
Cultural communities may be regarded as voluntary associations to the extent mat members recognize as legitimate the terms of association and the author- ity that upholds them. All that is necessary as evidence of such recognition is the fact that members choose not to leave. Recognition in these austere terms would, of course, be meaningless without the individual having one important right against the community: the right to be free to leave. That has to be the individual's fundamental right; it is also his only fundamental right, all other rights being either derivative of this right, or rights granted by the community.
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He adds that "the primacy of freedom of association is all-important; it has to take priority over other liberties-such as those of speech or worship-which lie at the core of the liberal tradition."
18 Allowing, as we should, that the rights of exit are necessary, is it correct to suppose that they exhaust the fundamental rights of individuals against groups?
There are three powerful reasons to doubt this. First, as I have argued in the previous section, the bare existence of a right of exit does not establish that particular groups are free associations. The exit model is too much in the grip of an economic view of human nature, according to which well-informed consumers enter and leave the market with low transaction costs. But the forms of group life that matter most to us are not at all like that: Group membership has noninstrumental value, entry is automatic or even ascriptive, the groups structure whole lives, and the transaction costs of change are huge. The notion that the dissatisfied might simply leave is, in such circumstances, fatuous.
There is a second reason to doubt the supremacy and sufficiency of associative freedom. The argument depends on the supposition that if cultural communities were free in the relevant sense, then their norms would necessarily command respect or tolerance because of the respect due to agreements or choices. However, it is not plausible to suppose that agreement has unlimited power. Agreements create, vary, and extinguish rights and duties only because there are good reasons to endorse the power-conferring rule that they may do so. But the underlying reasons do not go so far as to validate every purported exercise of the power in question.
Consider, for example, the rule that confers the power to make ordinary contracts. This is a desirable rule for a number of reasons-it allows us to make mutually profitable deals, to commit ourselves to future plans, to establish new relationships, and so on. But an ordinary contract has limits to its validity. Slavery contracts are void ab initio. In many jurisdictions a trade union and an employer cannot make a collective agreement that permits discrimination against employees on grounds of race, religion, sex, nationality, and so on. Locke conceded, surprisingly for his time, that there is a right to exit from marriage, at least where it is not prohibited by civil law. Yet he also denied that the marriage contract could ever give husbands despotic power over their wives: The considerations that ground the right 17. Kukathas, supra note 2, at 238. 18. Id. at 248.
to divorce also ground rights to fair treatment during the duration of the marriage. 19 These examples all illustrate the typical limits to the scope of our normative powers. Similarly, there is no reason to suppose that even willingly created associations have unlimited authority over their members, and that in turn suggests that at least some other rights are as fundamental as the right of exit.
The third reason for doubting the thesis flows from the nature of exit rights themselves. What is the justification for requiring groups to respect a right of exit? It may enhance social stability and perhaps utility by ensuring that only those who are committed to the ways of the group remain. Neither of these, however, would warrant imposing exit as a necessary condition of the authority of groups, since either of them might be qualified in any number of circumstances. Is it to secure the value of tolerance? That depends on what we have in mind by that ideal. As Will Kymlicka argues, the millet system of the Ottoman empire expressed a kind of tolerance, for it was a federation of self-governing theocracies some of which rigorously crushed heresy and apostasy within while not interfering with the regimes in other millets. 20 Although the system was fairly stable and offered a modus vivendi among Jewish, Christian, and Muslim subjects it was a "deeply conservative and patriarchal society, antithetical to the ideals of personal liberty.'' 21 Now, when Kukathas identifies the central value underlying rights of exit, he puts it this way: "No one can be required to accept a particular way of life." 22 But that ideal was not honored in the millet system, for although the Ottoman empire did not require its subjects to adopt a particular religion, some of the millets did. Even where apostasy was not a crime, there were severe internal restrictions on basic liberties. These people were required to accept a particular way of life, by their own communities, which enjoyed the tolerance and even support of the empire. Thus, it does not seem that tolerance is the key either.
Underneath the idea that no one can be required to accept a particular way of life lies, I think, the familiar notion of personal autonomy. The fundamental reason for thinking exit necessary is to fulfil the protective and expressive functions that enhance the capacity for a self-directed life, including the capacity to form, revise, and pursue our ends. Exit is necessary, not for stability, utility, or even tolerance, but to secure individual autonomy. The interest in self-direction is so important and central that it warrants holding others duty-bound to respect it. That is the ground of exit rights. This is, of course, a judgment of political morality and not yet a prescription for institutional design. Whether such rights ought to be pro- tected by law-to say nothing of constitutional law-is a separate question entirely.
If that is correct, however, it also follows that the right of exit is an insufficient safeguard for justice within groups. First, there are conditions necessary for the right of exit to be effective, and these generate further rights. Second, the value of individual autonomy that underlies the right to exit is itself powerful enough to generate other rights independently of any instrumental connection with exit. The following rights can, I think, all be established in the following ways.
A. Freedom of Dissociation
This is the claim right that others not prevent one from leaving the jurisdiction of the group. It is the core right of exit. Because people may be prevented in a variety of ways from leaving, this will in turn give rise to a variety of further rights. For example, as Kukathas himself acknowledges, it follows that cultural communities must respect rights against enslavement and some forms of physical coercion. 23 Nor can apostasy be made a crime.
B. Right to Mobility
To leave the jurisdiction of a territorial group one must be able to cross its borders. But to reach the border one must be allowed to get there, so one must be entitled to move around with some degree of freedom within the group and, finally, out of it. Thus, groups cannot seek to restrict mobility in ways that would effectively hold people captive. The Taliban militia were therefore wrong to prevent women from driving cars; the Soviet Union was wrong to withhold identification papers necessary for travel, and so on. In the case of territorial groups, people may also have a right to adequate identification papers to allow them to travel.
C. Freedom of Expression
Before one can leave one must know where one can go, how to get there, and how to get out. The need for this information generates a right to (at least limited) freedom of expression grounded both in the interests of the audience in having the information, and in the interests of the speaker in being able to provide it. Yet many minority groups, especially religions, seek to restrict the sort of information their members receive about the world. 23 . Id. at 249-50. Kukathas also claims that would be bound by liberal prohibitions on "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment," though this seems unmotivated in view of his argument strategy.
In the American case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, for instance, the Amish defended their practice of removing their children from school before the prescribed age of 16, precisely in order to protect their community from the solvent of public education.
24 And information about the outside world is not the only thing that people may need. There is normally a good deal of dispute zvithin groups not only about how their purposes are to be pursued, but also a b o u t what they in fact are. 25 The decision about whether to stay or leave involves an assessment of where the group itself is going, and that requires freedom of expression about internal practices.
D. Freedom of Association
The right of exit is also incomplete without freedom of (internal) association allowing people to be able to get the information and make the preparations in order to leave. Moreover, even if the decision to leave is o n e that must be taken as an individual, it need not be a decision to leave alone. Locke held that a tacit consenter "is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other Commonwealth, or to agree with others to begin a new one."
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Kukathas appears to accept this. He notes that "individuals within the cultural community are free to leave together or in association with others a n d to reconstitute the community under modified terms of association."
27 In most cases people will want to leave with their families intact, and many religious groups collectively flee oppression (e.g., the Puritans, Doukhobors, Mennonites, etc.).
E. Fair Share of Common Resources
People may be prevented from leaving without being forbidden to leave. For example, they may be unjustly deprived of the necessary resources, and this too violates their rights of exit. This is not to say that a church, family, or university must enforce for itself the same principles of distributive justice that are appropriate to a whole society. Rather, it is that it must respect principles of justice in dissolution, conditioned by the legitimate expectations of the members. If there are exit taxes, these must not be punitive. What may be taken on departure will depend on the nature of the goods in question and the understandings of the community. The Laws say to Socrates that he can take whatever belongs to him, but Locke's tacit consenter has to give up, by sale if he can, but apparently without compen- 28 The issue is most difficult in the case of those who leave communal arrangements to which they contributed part of the joint product. It may often be that the product (arable land, buildings, etc.) is indivisible or immovable, and it may be difficult to apportion a proper share to each; but that need not preclude some form of compensation.
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I believe it plausible that rights to dissociate, to mobility, to free expression, to freedom of association, and to a fair share of common resources required by any conception of the right to exit are at least necessary to relieve the burden of internal restrictions. Perhaps there are other rights, too. The general point is this: The character and generality of the interest in autonomy means that the duties it is capable of generating cannot be confined to the right of exit.
Interestingly, there are some suggestions that Locke would have been more friendly to this conclusion than are some contemporary liberals. Locke denies that even free and purposive institutions can legitimately hold absolute authority over their members. Their power is limited: They may enforce those rules that are both necessary to the society and established by "common consent," and they may expel those who refuse to conform. But even this power is hedged: a [N]o Church is bound by the Duty of Toleration to retain any such person in her Bosom, as, after Admonition, continues obstinately to offend against the laws of the Society."
30 Locke insists, however, that the power of excommunication can extend no further than to dissolve the bond between member and society, and that it can attach no further adverse consequences to his departure: "[Nevertheless, in all such Cases care is to be taken that the Sentence of Excommunication, and the Execution thereof, carry with it no rough usage, of Word or Action, whereby the ejected person may any wise be damnified in Body or Estate. For all force . . . belongs only to the Magistrate." 31 So what Locke calls the "fundamental and immutable Right of a spontaneous Society, that has power to remove any of its Members who transgress the Rule of its Institution" is itself subject to stringent limitations:
32 People are entitled to fair notice, reasonable treatment, and to security of their property and person.
It may be said that the exit argument seeks to win only tolerance, and not 28. Those whose consent is, in Locke's terms, tacit are bound to obey die law only as long as their enjoyment of its benefits continues. (Express consenters are "perpetually and indispensably" obliged till the government dissolves.) They may, if they are landowners, take the land with any conditions that the donor assigned to it, but the direct jurisdiction of the government is only over the land, and if they give it up, one "is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other Commonwealth, or to agree with others to begin a new one, in vacuis locis.. validity, for the norms of groups; that is, it gives nonmembers a reason to restrain their hostile responses to internal restrictions, but it gives no one a reason to endorse those restrictions. John Stuart Mill believed something like that about Mormon women in polygamous marriages. He held that although the system violated their rights by allowing a double standard for women and men, it was voluntary on the part of the women. So long as Mormons "allow perfect freedom of departure for those who are dissatisfied with their ways," Mill maintained that they should be tolerated in the sense that outsiders may not try to put that practice "to an end." 33 By the same token, outsiders have no obligation to recognize the validity of Mormon marriages. As I have argued elsewhere, however, this is tolerance in an especially narrow sense. 34 It is true that one way to tolerate a practice is to refrain from eliminating it. Yet groups seeking tolerance typically want, and are offered, more than that. Tolerance is normally thought to include also: acknowledging their authority over those who endorse it, not seeking to undermine that authority, and sometimes even protecting it from the intervention of others. One may do all these things without endorsing the practice at all and, indeed, while remaining critical of it. If one understands tolerance merely as the refusal to eliminate a practice, then it might seem that the right to exit pre-empts any other rights of those subject to it-if their decision to remain undercuts a case for eliminating the practice, then it justifies tolerance in the narrow sense. But it does not justify tolerance in any broader sense: The right of exit does not show that polygamy should be recognized, not undermined, or protected.
Hence, certain internal restrictions must be regarded as illegitimate by anyone who endorses the right of exit. And we must therefore reject the view that this right has any special priority over other familiar civil rights. Exit rights are based on a fundamental interest in individual autonomy. That interest both on its own and through various instrumental connections with exit yields a cluster of related rights, all of which are to be respected as much by social groups as by the state.
V. WHO IS TO DECIDE?
This is a significant conclusion; it is also an exceedingly abstract one. Who is to decide what exit and its related rights actually require in particular circumstances? And won't this inevitably lead us down the path of interference with special groups, ultimately defeating the whole point of associative freedom?
There are two distinct issues here: a question of judgment, and a question of authority. In the first place, we have to draw concrete, conclusive judg-
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and TheirRi Shts, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES merits from abstract, prima facie rights. That is a major problem of moral and political philosophy. To say that rights of exit are necessary is not to say that those rights are absolute. A right may be a necessary feature of some regime, and yet liable to be qualified by conflicting rights. This need not mean that the right to exit ever drops out, though in some cases its force may be shown only indirectly-for example, by mandating compensation for those who cannot leave, or who cannot leave on the preferred terms. It may even be that in exceptional cases, members of groups may be temporarily conscripted to remain when, for instance, there would be catastrophic costs for third parties in allowing them to leave now rather than later. The position here is no different from other cases of conflicting moral rights. The second issue is the one of authority. It is important to notice that this arises not only when we recognize the other internal rights of members but also with the right of exit itself. For who is to decide when the right of exit has been validly exercised? As Thomas v. Norris demonstrates, it may be hazardous to leave that up to the group itself. And when we concede that the right of exit is insufficient to secure the sort of autonomy that is at stake, the problem ramifies further. Who or what body may properly render judgments about these other matters and, if necessary, enforce them? This too is a complex question, and I shall only make a few tentative remarks.
Locke's answer was this: "[S]ince the joyning together of several Members into this Church Society . . . is absolutely free and spontaneous, it necessarily follows, that the Right of making its Laws can belong to none but the Society it self, or at least (which is the same thing) to those whom the Society by common consent has authorized thereunto."
35 That is the view that has attracted the favor of most contemporary theorists as well. As Denise Reaume puts it: "If outsiders intervene in disputes between internal dissidents and the rest of the group, they are usurping the power to decide the ultimate membership criteria of the group."
36
The Catholic who thinks divorced teachers should not be fired from separate schools, and yet thinks the fired teacher is wrong to bring unjust dismissal proceedings; the Aboriginal woman who knows at first hand about sex discrimination with her community and yet is against making self-government subject to the Charter-each demonstrates her faith in the internal capacity of her community to permit fair and free discussion and deliberation of these issues. Outsiders may facilitate such discussion where possible, but they should not interfere to determine the outcome of the debate.
37
There is good sense in this view. But there are powerful reasons for avoiding coercion that have nothing to do with the proper scope of a group's 35. Locke, supra note 4, at 28-29. 36. Reaume, supra note 25, at 138. 37. Id. at 141. Reaume insists, however, that one who is ultimately unable to persuade the group of her views must finally remain free to exit. authority over its members. Coercion is always a blunt instrument, often a risky and costly one, and it may provoke backlash. Consider arranged marriages. The availability of divorce (if it exists) does not negate the wrong in a compulsory union between unwilling partners. Nevertheless, there may be independent reasons for not prohibiting or annulling such unions, for to do that may promote an ethnocentric understanding of the nature of marriage; it may violate settled expectations, and it may just be too wasteful of the limited resources that any community has for securing compliance.
It is one thing to say what rights bear on an issue, another to enforce them. From the claim that it is wrong to enforce a certain right and in that way intervene in a group, it does not follow that members of the group have only a right of exit. Rights ground duties on the part of others, and when those duties are violated, some response is called for, though it need n o t always be one of coercive enforcement. It is also possible to demand, encourage, and entice others to respect rights. So it is, on a number of grounds, often better to try to facilitate agreed solutions than to impose some external judgment on them.
Having said that, however, it is sometimes difficult to know how to draw the line between insiders and outsiders, as the following example suggests. Before certain amendments to the Canadian Indian Act, Indian husbands could bring non-Indian wives into their band, but Indian wives could not bring in their non-Indian husbands. In Savmdge Band v. Canada™ three Indian bands in Alberta sought a declaration that the amendments that restored band membership to aboriginal women who married out infringed their aboriginal or treaty right to determine their own membership. The trial court held that there was no such pre-existing right, 39 that if there had been it was altered by the imposition of British sovereignty and ultimately extinguished by the 1982 constitution, which, while preserving treaty and aboriginal rights, also prohibited sex discrimination. 40 Is this outside interference? As is often the case, members of the group were themselves divided. Many native women favored the amendments, as did the Native Council of Canada; those elders in power in the bands did not. On the other hand, the whole organization of Indians into bands, and the parlous circumstances in which Canadian aboriginals often live, are themselves products of prior outside influence. (Part of the reason the court in Saxvridge denied that there was a pre-existing right of the sort the bands claimed was that, in Canadian law, Indian bands are creatures of statute, and what statute did statute could also undo.) In these circumstances, trying to 38. [1995] 4C.N.L.R.121. 39. There was even some evidence that patrilinearity, so far from being an aboriginal custom, was itself a European imposition: It was the Indian Act and not traditional custom that excluded women who marry out from status. The court accepted anthropological testimony to In «M ' m e m b e r s h i P was a good deal more fluid. Id.
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CtlOn ^ " " g u a r a n t e e d e( * ual t o m a l e a n d f e m^ persons." Constitution determine what counts as internal authority and what counts as external intervention does not seem very promising. We are left, then, with the untidy reality of conflicting moral rights, a general but inconclusive presumption against coercion, and no universally applicable doctrine of authority capable of settling these disputes. We have displaced the simple answer of group sovereignty subject to a right of exit only to open the issue up to a complex cluster of unavoidable moral and political judgments.
VI. THE AUTONOMY OF GROUPS
The defense of internal dissidents may give rise to worries about the extent to which individual autonomy is compatible with the autonomy of social groups. This is important, for these groups are not irritants in the body politic-as I have suggested, they are of positive value because they contribute to the well-being of individuals, and also because a system that has a plurality of different groups is more likely to hit on some successful experiments in living. However, it may now seem that we have done through the back door what we would not do through the front door. Have we not just made social groups directly accountable to the familiar set of basic rights, rights that special groups may not endorse and which may stand in the way of their distinctive projects? There may be no harm in insisting on a nondiscriminatory rationing of resources on an Indian reserve, but to insist on sex equality in fundamentalist Muslim communities may be tantamount to a change in religion, and to deny Catholic schools the power to fire gay teachers may be to require that they abandon their sexual morality.
This objection reflects a fear of social homogenization-the concern that all religions will end up like the Church of England, all cultural minorities like the Scots, all social groups like the Freemasons, all of whom accommodated themselves quite well to the rising liberal order around them, mainly by transformation. This fear, although not baseless, is exaggerated. As we have seen, the rights in question are abstract and capable of being expressed and respected in many different ways, and whether or not they should be institutionalized and protected by legal mechanisms remains an open question. It seems likely that the judiciary will have a different role and status in different societies depending on their political culture, history, and especially on what other institutions are capable of protecting rights. Moreover, as we have seen, there are good reasons for supporting internal adjudicative mechanisms for such groups, and these will inevitably steer the internal political culture in directions suited to their distinctive history, purposes, and character. Freedom of expression in the Catholic Church will not be expected to match that within a secular university, though both must find ways to honor the ideal That ZT room for a lot of moral and cultural diversity, though perham W ! r than some would like. g perhaps less diversity
Many partisans of minority groups are attracted to the austere combination of exit and tolerance because they imagine that rights of exit are fairly benign, whereas both the rights of internal minorities and the interference of outsiders are risky. They are mistaken about both terms of the comparison. Respecting the other rights is often less risky than they suppose, while limiting dissent to the right of exit is a good deal more hazardous. As Hirschman argues, exit tends to drive out voice. In a consumer market, when the price of a product goes up, the first customers to leave are those at the margin for whom a slight shift will change their preferences. However, when exit is an option and the quality of a product falls, it is the most quality-sensitive customers who leave. 41 In many cases those are precisely the customers who, if they were to stay and lobby for change, could have the most beneficial impact. In the United States the middle classes are the first to exit a decaying public school system, and in Britain they are the first to leave the collapsing National Health Service. In each case, the net result is that public institutions become even worse; then they lose their next most sensitive clients, and so on, until those who are left are simply those who are stuck.
Exit is always a crude, and mute, response to dissatisfaction-even hotels and restaurants try to get additional information about why their customers do, or do not, return. Institutions as complex and significant as churches or universities are likely to find that approaching their adherents on a "take it or leave it" basis is equally foolish. Social groups that are organized so as to rely on exit as the only or main response to dissatisfaction may therefore end up by threatening the survival of the group: Those most able to adapt and transform may be the first to leave. (This much we have seen in the exodus of German intellectuals in the 1930s and of Eastern Europeans after the war.) Groups thus have an incentive to provide for internal channels for dissent and to resist the thought that dissidents should simply leave. So far from guaranteeing group autonomy, an exclusive focus on rights of exit leaves groups prey to a loss of control and inability to adapt to changing circumstances.
Still, there is no denying that there are costs to respecting the right of exit. As we have seen, it is but one of a cluster of rights that serve autonomy and, whatever we choose to call it, a "real," "meaningful," or "substantive" right of exit will burden some groups in ways that they would rather avoid. There is also a cost that arises merely from the availability of a right of exit, whether or not it is exercised. The modern world has been a maelstrom of change, but there are other worlds with other values. Certain cultures, including (some say) the aboriginal peoples of North America and Australasia, appear not to place much value on individual autonomy, perhaps because in their more stable social environments they did not need it. 41 . Hirschman, supra note 9, at 47.
Writing of the Maori, for example, Richard Mulgan notes how the possibility of leaving has altered post-contact communities:
Once the possibility of leaving with impunity becomes practicable and the fact of staying becomes a deliberate decision the ethical balance between individual and group has shifted irrevocably in the individual's direction. Today loyalty to the group and submersion in its activities and purposes can never be recovered. 42 We need to be cautious in supposing that the burden of choice is a uniquely modern phenomenon. In every society people make choices about family and kinship; they make decisions about how to interact with neighboring clans, and there is often some fluidity to group membership. What is surely true, however, is that the scope and significance of these choices have dramatically increased, perhaps nowhere as much as in those pre-industrial cultures and fundamentalist religions that have persisted into the modern era. Choice is an intrusion in such groups. Often, the conflict is over the future of their children, for it is through their children that parents aspire to ensure the survival of their culture and values. I am not persuaded that there is, in fact, much value in cultural survival for its own sake-and we must not lose sight of the fact that the raw materials out of which groups produce survival are the lives of other people. 43 Quite apart from that, however, the right of exit itself works to make certain kinds of group life harder to sustain. An unreflective attachment in which interests of the self and group are not distinguished becomes nearly impossible, and with it at least some forms of communitarian and identity politics.
Is this ground for regret? Hegel (in some moods) and certain modern communitarians appear to think so. When life becomes fraught with choice our attachments may seem no more solid than the shifty human will. It is as if we have been thrust into a realm of obligatory existentialism. But it is not the imposition of basic liberties on the internal constitution of groups that makes that so-it comes with the right of exit itself. Insisted on as the necessary and sufficient condition for individual autonomy, it proves to be both less and more than bargained for. 42. Richard Mulgan, MAORI, PAKEHA AND DEMOCRACY 64 (1989) , as cited in Kukathas, supra note 2, at 249.
43. I would want to distinguish between cultural survival, and cultural security. The latter protects cultures only against unfair pressures to conform to majority practices. See Leslie Green, Are Language RightsFundamental? 25 OSCOODE HALL L.J. 653-58 (1987) .
